The future for socialism
Eastern Europe: The bitter fruits of capitlist restoration
Russia
Since the introduction of market reforms in the late 1980’s and the mass privatisation programme that in Russia has gone probably further than in any other country, production has dropped by 50 per cent and investment by 65 per cent.
The war in Chechnya has, at the very least, led to 30,000 dead. Russians are being shot every day as the Mafia activities, corruption and simple crime has spread beyond all imagination.
In this situation it is difficult to understand how Yeltsin, the President who caused all this, could win the election with 54 per cent of the vote. Undoubtedly Yeltsin had a huge advantage in that he controls the state apparatus and, in reality, the whole of the mass media. Some regional governors promised to mobilise for Yeltsin a large proportion of the electorate in their regions. For the whole course of the election campaign all the TV channels and probably, without exception, all the major newspapers pushed pro-Yeltsin propaganda at every possible moment. On election night on one of the main TV channels, the presenters were leading the applause every time a good vote for Yeltsin was announced.
But media coverage is only a secondary factor to explain why Yeltsin won the election. The main reason is to be found in the political and organisational bankruptcy of his main opponent - Zyuganov. Zyuganov started the election campaign as the candidate of the Communist Party and finished it as the candidate of the National Patriotic Block. The Russian Communist Party has no analogy in Western political parties or even in some of the reformed Communist Parties of Eastern Europe.
With the present economic position in which there are hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of workers not getting paid wages on time and with unemployment growing there should have been a huge potential for the Communist Party to mobilise the discontent. One opinion poll in the week before the election explained that only 20 per cent of Russians approve of the fact that Russia has gone down the road of capitalism. 58 per cent, including 30 per cent of youth, disapprove. But the Communist Party has an economic programme based on almost classic protectionism. They could not only not offer an alternative to Yeltsin’s economic programme but many of their points had already been taken up by Yeltsin.
One of the main authors of the Communist Party programme was a certain Glazev who is General Lebed’s main economic advisor. The Communist Party and Zyuganov were completely incapable of offering any alternative to the electorate. Massive rock concerts were organised for Yeltsin in Moscow about 2 or 3 weeks before the election. There were very few hard core Yeltsin supporters at these concerts. The youth that were there at first said they were going to support Yeltsin but then said: "We don’t have any proper housing" and "I can only work as a porter", "There’s no work for someone with my special training" and "We’re afraid of conscription because of the war in Chechnya". Although they had no real confidence that Yeltsin could solve these problems or would do anything about them, Zyuganov made absolutely no attempt to say anything about these problems. Even worse, Zyuganov - whose supporters are largely older people - during the course of the campaign even contrasted the responsibility and discipline of the older population to the irresponsibility of the youth, dividing the generations.
Nevertheless just over 40 per cent of the electorate did vote for Zyuganov. That includes 51 per cent of the Kemerovo Region which covers the huge Kuzbas mining area. Zyuganov also gained a majority in the whole "red belt" of cities and industrial regions across the south of Russia and Siberia. The main reason is that these cities have gained nothing from the reforms that have taken place in the last 5 years except devastating economic catastrophe. Many living in these areas have barely seen even some of the minimal democratic rights and freedoms that people in Moscow are now used to. The factory and regional chiefs who were in power before are still in power in many places. They just have different philosophies of life. And so, in many ways out of desperation, people in these areas voted for Zyuganov arguing: "Things cannot be any worse and maybe with Zyuganov it will allow a few things to change for the better".
Another important factor is the war in Chechnya. 58 per cent of the population say they are in favour of an immediate end to the war and many of them say "at any cost". But Zyuganov refused to offer a solution. When he was interviewed on television he said that he would leave any decisions up to the military chiefs in Chechnya and that it should remain part of Russia. This gave Yeltsin the opportunity to cobble together a cease-fire, at least temporarily, and to form an alliance with Lebed (who has even spoken in support of the right of independence for Chechnya) in order to give the impression that he would be more likely to end the war than Zyuganov.
In the week before the election, in an event which must be unprecedented on a world scale - the widow of General Dudayev (the Chechen President killed in the war (eds)) and the leader of the Chechen military, Basayev, speaking on central Russian television saying they wanted a Yeltsin victory!
The Communist Party is obviously incompetent. But that is not the whole story. The Communist Party has a dual character. There is said to be a small section in the leadership of the Communist Party who are attempting to make it more like one of the reformed Communist Parties of Eastern Europe by rejecting some of its Stalinist past. The overwhelmingly dominant tendency in the Communist Party, however, is the former Stalinists who have retained all the worst reactionary aspects of Stalinism including Russian chauvinism, nationalism, anti- semitism and patriotism. They have rejected anything linked with the idea of planning the economy and the right of workers to run their own lives.
As it became clear that Yeltsin was beginning to pull ahead in the election, Zyuganov and the leadership of the Communist Party moved further to the right. All that they were able to propose after the first round was that the Communist Party would form a coalition government if it won. In it they wanted to include pro-marketers like Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, Yavlinsky and one third of Yeltsin’s present government. They tried to attract General Lebed and a number of other reactionary activists. Not surprisingly nearly all of them said that they would refuse to serve in such a government. Their reactionary nationalism was then reinforced further by the comments of Zyuganov and one of his allies, Anpilov. Zyuganov said there was a "satanic plot" to build a fifth column to divide Russia up into little pieces. Anpilov, who is supposed to be a left or far left representative of one of the Communist Parties, said there were "too many Jews on television and too many (western) soap operas".
Such statements discouraged people who were going to vote CP because they wanted some economic improvement. They alienated a whole layer of people in the big cities. In the four biggest regions of Russia - that is Moscow, the Moscow Region, Leningrad and Ekaterinburg - Yeltsin won 75 per cent of the vote. That is a higher level than those people who voted for the pro-market parties in December 1995. Undoubtedly, in these big cities there are people - a minority, but in some cases quite a big minority - who have benefited from the market reforms. But there also exist some of the biggest disparities of wealth. The differences between the richest and the poorest in Moscow is 50:1 compared to 14:1 for the rest of Russia. The paradox is that more people who voted for Yeltsin in these big cities were actually against what he stands for.
An opinion poll asking people who voted for Yeltsin their opinion on a number of things showed that between one third and a half disapproved of the ideas of democracy, capitalism, parliament and the markets. But, because Zyuganov had nothing to offer these people, they tended to vote for stability. "At least if Yeltsin stays in there won’t be big new upheavals" they thought: "Better to vote for the devil you know than the devil you don’t." This was particularly true amongst the youth of the main cities. Only 8 per cent of them voted for Zyuganov, many arguing: "Yes, things are bad, but you just cannot go back to the times of our grandparents and parents; you have to go forward somehow."
Of course when, after the first round, Yeltsin sacked the hated General Grachev plus his own bodyguard and the head of the KGB, it helped to give an impression that a victory for Yeltsin would bring some changes for the better. There wasn’t time for people to realise that he sacked his corrupt Rasputin-like clique - the "Party of War" as it was known - only to replace them by an aspiring General Pinochet - Lebed.
There was a lot of discussion on how Russian socialists grouped around Workers’ Democracy would intervene and what position they would take in these elections. It very quickly became clear that the position of 1993 put forward by Workers’ Democracy of "Vote against all!" could not be repeated. This would have isolated Russian socialists from most people who felt this time they had to vote and they had to decide because they did not want to leave their fate in somebody else’s hands.
So the headlines in Workers’ Democracy in December said: "Vote against the Right!". But many workers asked who was "Left". Later, for the presidential campaign, Workers’ Democracy had a cartoon of a drunken Yeltsin and said: "Five more years, no way!". Many people naturally interpreted this as a call to vote for Zyuganov. Russian socialists grouped around Workers’ Democracy came under an immense amount of pressure to call for a vote for Zyuganov, particularly those who worked in factories.
While there are not very many politically active workers in Russia, a considerable number said that although Zyuganov would not improve their position, a victory for him would at least get rid of Yeltsin and allow new movements to emerge. It would also show workers that it was possible to defeat the open capitalists in Russia and maybe that would help to encourage them to take the very first steps in organising.
Nevertheless Workers’ Democracy felt that it was very important to warn of the consequences of a Zyuganov victory and what it could mean for the working class and the unions.
Workers’ Democracy warned about the dangers of Zyuganov’s economic programme, of the danger of increasing national conflicts and the danger of a backlash - a reaction against the Communist Party - particularly amongst the youth. Russian socialists did not call for a vote for the Communist Party in Workers’ Democracy. Instead the following position was put: "We understand why workers are preparing to vote for the Communist Party. We support their desire to kick Yeltsin out of power. But look at the Communist Party. Is it really capable of changing anything? Today the working class needs its own party, programme, candidates. It needs international working class unity and not the Unity of Patriotic Forces. It needs the democratic planned economy and not a mixed economy under the control of the bosses. We need to start work on building such an alternative".
In the move to the right of Zyuganov in the later stages of the campaign it became clearer and more understandable why it was correct to make those warnings rather than to succumb to the pressure. It is most likely that the CP, which is organising a Conference of Patriotic Forces in August, will sink into this quagmire of patriotism and will disappear. It may even lose its independent structure as a Communist Party and merge into a Patriotic Party. Unfortunately although there could well be a split claiming to be ‘left’ from this organisation it will be little more than a small Stalinist sect.
Yeltsin has won another four years (if he lives that long!) but he has created huge problems for himself. He has aligned himself with General Lebed who spent the first two weeks of his campaign demanding more and more power and authority for himself, making it quite clear that he considers himself the next president. As a result there have already been big clashes between Lebed and Chernomyrdin, the Prime Minister, over who has what power. Supporters of sacked General Grachev and the other ‘Party of War’ members are not lying down to die but are attempting to provoke new struggles and new instability. It is quite possible that it is people like that who were behind the bomb attacks in Moscow. It is certainly true that it is people like that who have provoked the new fighting in Chechnya.
The economy, after several years of promises of growth, is still declining - although slowly as compared to the past. The idea that there is going to be any real foreign investment or growth or development does not have support even among the most ardent of capitalists. The Russian economy is going to be stagnant and incapable of developing in any real way to solve the problems of the workers. In answer to the question "Are they (the former Stalinist bloc economies) going to leap forward like tigers?", in Russia’s case it is going to be more like a dead bear!
Rob Jones, Editorial Board of Workers’ Democracy, CWI affiliated newspaper in Russia.
Czech Republic
The central European countries of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are portrayed by Western imperialism as a "shop window" of how the market economy is working well and creating growth and prosperity.
The government in the Czech Republic has over the years praised itself for its successful economic policy. The Czech ruling class clearly regard their success as guaranteeing the country first place in the queue to join the European Union and NATO.
The government actually believed its own extremely optimistic propaganda. Therefore the general election result in June 1996 came as a big shock. The optimism of Klaus, the Prime Minister, changed after he saw the first election results where Social Democracy went up from 6 per cent in the last elections to 26 per cent, just 3 per cent behind the ruling ODP. But it was not only the ruling class who were shocked by the election results - even the so-called left wing parties were very surprised. They used the slogan "Vote for us so that the Right Wing does not get a two thirds majority". A majority of this size would have allowed the right wing to make changes to the constitution. It was the aim of the left parties to get at least one third of seats in Parliament. The elections resulted in the former government party having only 99 seats out of 200 and it is now in a minority. The cynicism of the ruling class! They portray themselves as the best defenders of Czech national interests but when they saw the results of the elections they panicked and started to sell the Czech currency - the crown. Foreign investors who came to the Czech republic to speculate bought up the millions of crowns being sold on the financial markets. The Czech banks and investors faced a nightmare situation because they saw the possibility of a currency crisis. The Czech crown collapsed not because of foreign capital, but because Czech capitalists sold the crown and bought hard currencies.
Generally these elections represented an important shift in consciousness in society - demonstrating a rejection of the neo-liberal, naked form of capitalist restoration the country has faced since 1989. It also represented a shift to the left in terms of wide sections of society returning to the idea that the state has to provide protection to the most impoverished in society and in support of the welfare state. These processes were not necessarily visible on the surface but represented important changes that had been gathering strength over a period of time. The main illusion in the market was the idea that privatisation would open the way to massive foreign investment and to the implementation of new technology. When the CWI’s Czech group produced the first issue of its paper nearly six years ago it was the only political group who explained that privatisation was no solution; it would not bring any significant investment which could improve the old economy of the Czech republic. That was met with outright disbelief by everyone, including the more thinking workers.
However, this election represented a massive protest against privatisation and its failure to bring new technology, better production techniques and better working conditions. It was a protest which indicated the correctness of the position of Czech socialists six years previously. The Czech ruling class through the ODP had run a relentless propaganda campaign ever since their election to government about the necessity and desirability of economic neo-liberal measures. This was essential to maintaining support for these ideas amongst the Czech working class. One concrete development they used to back this up was the growth in the Czech economy. There was a certain truth in this claim. For the last year and a half there was economic growth of 5 per cent and this year it is expected to be 6 per cent. But workers have had no share in this growth and they know they have seen nothing from it.
Half of the growth is accounted for the increase in the building trade. However, this property boom is for the super rich elite in society and the tourist trade. The main areas of building are hotels, reconstruction of houses into office, and villas for rich families. This has happened at the same time when there has been a loss 20 000 flats a year in the Czech Republic which were used by Czech workers. Recent figures show that 55 per cent of growth was financed by private consumption. However, this was not spending by the majority of working class people who have seen the real value of their wages falling and the costs of transport and rents increasing. The increase in private consumption was caused by a handful of people who enriched themselves rapidly as a result of their positions in the elite of the old Stalinist society. Sections of more conscious workers understood that the very people they were fighting against in 1989 were profiting from the new capitalist regime.
The discontent of the working class was reflected in the general elections in the vote for the Social Democrats. Workers in effect said: "No more to ‘speculation’ (privatisation) which does not bring us anything"... "No more to the reactionary right who accuse us of just drinking and not working hard enough and who say the only trouble with the Czech economy is the Czech workers".
The Social Democrats and that section of the ruling class (industrial managers and investors) that has turned to Social Democracy used slightly different arguments in these elections than the proponents of naked neo-liberal capitalist policies did before. They exploited the growing feeling against nonsensical privatisation and speculation. Their main argument was that a new government should fight for "genuine investment". Their idea was one of semi-protectionist or state interventionist investment to protect industry.
However in many ways this was just propaganda. Within two weeks of the elections Social Democratic economists confirmed that Social Democracy would never nationalise privatised industries or attack new property rights.
An important aspect in determining future political and economic perspectives is the extent to which capitalist restoration has taken place and what is the nature of this restoration. The Czech republic has probably seen capitalist restoration going furthest out of all other Eastern European countries except in Eastern Germany. For the vast majority of the economy there was legal restoration of capitalism on paper and ownership rights passed over to individuals or firms. But this paper restoration does not represent the practical reality or the difficulties facing capitalist restoration. In many cases investment firms and individual owners do not run the companies on a day to day basis.
This is shown by the mergers of some of the investment funds set up to take advantage of privatisation where new owners are not prepared even to take over the running of enterprises on a day to day basis. For example, the newly-created investment group called ‘Daventry Investment’, which came from a fusion of the American Stratton Investment Company and one of the big Czech investment funds which controls many enterprises but never intervenes in the management of different enterprises. In fact, they have recently announced that they will move their investment to countries like Poland, Russia and other markets.
The ruling class and sections of manufacturing industrial capitalists are very concerned about the potential chaos in industry. The ruling class is no longer as united as it was when it formed the ruling elite in the period following the collapse of Stalinism, composed as it was of the pro-capitalist layer, managers of state industry and Stalinist state functionaries, who were drunk on victory believing: "Yes, now we are going to be champions". Now the ruling class is split into at least two parts. The more "far-sighted" sections have seen that the previous arguments used to bolster working class illusions in capitalist restoration no longer work and they can no longer expect an acquiescent work force. This part of the ruling class is now trying to whip up new support from the workers for their slightly changed ideas of increased investment, an end to speculation and a return to "reasonable politics". It is this section which is politically represented by the Social Democrats. On the other hand the government party (ODP) and other sections of the ruling class representing finance capital now see the way forward as joining the European Union and NATO and sees much closer links with Western capitalist economies. In both cases a certain weakness of the ruling class is demonstrated. One section feels it needs support from the working class to introduce its demands, whereas the other feels it needs international support for its policies. Neither section of the ruling class is able to play a leading independent role in society.
An example of the new type of politics the ruling class is prepared to adopt is shown by the case of a steel factory near Prague, originally employing 40 000 workers before 1989. The privatisation of the factory by splitting twenty different sections into independent companies, very much reliant on each other, drove the entire enterprise to the edge of bankruptcy. The director gave a day’s holiday to the entire work force and took them on a march to Prague. Five thousand workers demonstrated against the government, with the director leading the way, opposing the method of privatisation. The demonstration ended with the director calling for vote for the Social Democrats.
The anti-government mood that developed amongst the working class in the run up to the elections will not simply disappear. Anti-capitalist tendencies will crystallise as workers see that the new bourgeois claims about investment are not true and it is not able to solve their problems. But the development of an anti-capitalist tendency will bring with it dangers as well, because there is no existing political force which can capture this mood and develop it in a socialist direction in a mass way at the moment. The working class has protested against the effects of capitalism and the Social Democrats are the party which has captured this mood but it cannot become a long lasting answer for the working class.
The Communist Party will not be a formation which workers will seek out to provide answers. It is very sectarian and in fact blames the workers for it not being in power. There is a common belief amongst the CP leadership that when workers are completely impoverished, they will turn back to the Communist Party and wish to go back to the old regime. This is obviously a utopian view. However, what is more important is the feeling of the working class after the elections. This feeling is: "Well we have been able to defeat the government; we will be able to get something at last." There is a mood that has been developing over the last year which opens big opportunities for the Czech group of the CWI and for a renewal of the workers’ movement and its traditions. There are conflicts looming about reforms of the health service and education. There will be conflicts about the plans for the privatisation of energy, transport and banks. There already exists huge opposition against privatisation of the health service, education and transport.
Regional campaigns against the effects of neo-liberal policies and even campaigns like last year’s long fight of the doctors against the government will create the conditions where things will objectively be much more positive for the growth of socialist ideas. Also the conditions will materialise under which the Czech group of the CWI can convince increasing layers of workers and youth of the need to create a new workers’ party.
The Czech group of the CWI was responsible for initiating one of the biggest campaigns against attacks on the education system since 1989. This was the campaign against cuts in education grants. This campaign was the only one which succeeded in defeating the government in the period since November 1989. As activists amongst the youth, the Czech group of the CWI has gained a big authority even in the trade unions and amongst workers. It is interventions like this that will lead to a mass basis for socialist and Marxist ideas amongst the whole of the working class in the future.
Petr Jindra, Editorial Board of Budoucnost, CWI affiliated paper in the Czech Republic.
Poland
Capitalism has had six years to carry out its programme of restoration in Eastern Europe. These countries can now be characterised as being capitalist countries. However, this process is not one hundred per cent complete.
Capitalism faces enormous problems for its future development. This is shown clearly with the example of Poland.
Poland was the first European country to apply "shock therapy" in terms of the widespread application of neo-liberal policies, but now Poland is one of the last countries in terms of the completion of the privatisation of state industries. Heavy industries in Poland such as steel, coal mines and shipyards are still under state ownership. It is an irony of history that the Gdansk shipyard, which was the birthplace of ‘Solidarity’, is now facing bankruptcy. The bankruptcy of the shipyard in Gdansk is seen as a test case for the government. If they succeed in closing it down then it will pave the way for further closures in heavy industry.
The CWI’s perspective from the beginning was that capitalism could not develop countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The small growth observed in recent years does not contradict this. This limited growth followed a catastrophic fall in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the first years following the collapse of Stalinism. Poland has just returned to the GDP level of 1989. At the present rate of growth it will take 50 years for Poland to catch up to the level of the West. Unemployment is still high, at 14.4 per cent and inflation is 22 per cent. The growth experienced in the last few years has not improved the living standards of workers significantly.
In Poland the situation exists where pensioners, public sector workers, teachers and health workers have become pauperised. Even according to the government’s official statistics 13 per cent of Polish population lives in poverty - over five million people. Half of Polish families live "in need".
The main problem is that capitalism cannot provide the enormous resources needed to modernise industry in Eastern Europe. In 1995 foreign investment in the whole world came to $325 billion but in Eastern Europe only $12 billion were invested. That figure is the same as for foreign investment in Sweden. Poland last year received only $2.5 billion in foreign investment. Since 1989 it has received only $8 billion in total. This is just a drop in the ocean of what is needed.
The Polish economy is still weak and vulnerable. There has been some investment in car assembly plants in Poland, which at this stage is only very small scale production and employs very few workers. But, the development of this section of industry depends on the domestic market and the German market.
Growth in Poland has been to a large extent led by exports. But now, almost like a pair of scissors opening up, a large gap has developed between exports and imports . Imports are rising and exports out of Poland are falling. A down-turn in the German economy will cause enormous problems in Poland.
In terms of developments in political organisations there have been big changes. ‘Solidarity’ today is a totally different organisation from ‘Solidarity’ in the early 1980s. When ‘Solidarity’ was first set up it was more than a trade union. It was a revolutionary movement that had some similarities with the soviets which were formed during the Russian revolution. Many of the organisations which were thrown up during the struggles in the early 1980s could be considered as an embryonic form of workers’ control.
Of course, after martial law (Jaruzelski’s coup in 1981) the situation changed and the new structures were almost empty of workers.
In 1989 ‘Solidarity’ formed a government in Poland and after a while pro-capitalist parties emerged from the ‘Solidarity’ organisation. During the shock therapy period 1990-92, Solidarity formed a protective umbrella over the pro-capitalist governments. This was a period of sharp decline in the economy and of savage attacks when ‘Solidarity’ held back strikes and protests. It has become increasingly Catholic, nationalist and even anti-Semitic. In the large Ursus tractor factory in Warsaw, this has become even clearer. There the leader of ‘Solidarity’ is a neo-fascist!
This process is a reflection of the lumpenisation of large sections of society. Political parties in Poland are really divided into two camps. On the one hand there are parties which had their origins in ‘Solidarity’ but who are now independent of that movement. These range from the extreme right Catholic nationalist parties to bourgeois liberal parties. On the other hand there is the ex-Stalinist bloc, the biggest component of which is the Social Democratic party. Three years ago the Social Democrats won the parliamentary election on a wave of discontent and formed the government. Before the elections, the Social Democrats in Poland were very similar to those in the Czech Republic. During the parliamentary elections they made many promises and their slogan was: "It does not have to be so bad, the attacks don’t have to continue".
But when they came to power they carried out the same pro-capitalist policy as previous governments. The Social Democrats have more businessmen in their party than the bourgeois liberal parties. This is because the bureaucrats have become capitalists. Linked to the Social Democrats is the ex-Stalinist trade union called OPZZ. During the first ‘Solidarity’ government, OPZZ organised strikes and protests against "shock therapy" and now it is forming a protective umbrella over the government. During the presidential election last year, the Democratic Left or the Social Democratic candidate Kwasniewski defeated Walesa. However, although there was a polarisation in society, it was not expressed in terms of enthusiastic support for Kwasniewski, but hatred against the opposing candidate.
The Solidarity camp attacks the Social Democrats as "communists". But actually the Social Democrats have a more neo-liberal programme than ‘Solidarity’. ‘Solidarity’ now opposes some "wild" privatisations and want some kind of state intervention into the economy.
Last year the mass privatisation programme began in Poland - a program quite similar to the "coupon" system in the Czech Republic. Polish citizens could register and pay a small nominal fee and received a certificate which in the future would be exchanged for shares. For many years these enterprises will be controlled not by the share-owners but by the National Investment Funds. These Funds will be responsible for re-structuring the enterprises, for making mass redundancies and attacks on workers. While most Poles have certificates and are participating in this program, a referendum at the beginning of this year showed that 72 per cent were actually against this program and against the National Investment Funds. At the same time, 95 per cent of the population supported the idea of a similar programme but without the National Investment Funds.
This, in a way, expresses the mood for "fair privatisation" - the idea that state property should be distributed equally to all Poles. However, whatever programme is adopted, the effects will be the same. It will still lead to a concentration of capital.
The privatisation programme means different things to different people. Some people think that they can become small investors or capitalists, but others think they can regain control over the workplaces. Actually a party has been set up that supports this idea called the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP). They had a candidate in the presidential elections who won 9 per cent of the votes, which is a respectable figure. They took their campaign to the big industries. It was a very opportunistic, populist campaign against selling off state industries to foreigners and against "wild" privatisation. This party has gained a certain echo and received 15 per cent support in a recent opinion poll.
Some of the opposition to the effects of privatisation has been channelled into right-wing, nationalist parties. This of course is a contradiction, but the mood that exists in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is very contradictory. Although a consciousness against privatisation is developing there is no genuine socialist alternative through which such opposition can be directed.
Inevitably there will be a struggle by workers to defend living standards and jobs and against privatisation. But in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union the members of the CWI are fighting against the stream.
It will be objective events that will turn the tide and the working class in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will return to its historic traditions.