When kids in school learn about the countries of Europe different categories are used, depending what categories are taken into account. The question if Georgia belongs to Europe is as controversial as the question towards which power the country is leaning politically. As in Hungary, Belarus, Armenia, Slovakia and many other countries, Georgia is a battle ground between pro-Russian and pro-EU forces, at first hand, between US and China at second hand. The reason is the strategically important position of Georgia at the Black Sea with its ports, close to Iran, Turkey, central Asia, and Russia.
At the moment the situation is relatively stable but events like the blackout at the end of July could trigger new anti-government protests. On the other side, the question of national identity, national unity and minority rights that are used by different sides could trigger off new conflicts up to proxy military conflicts involving Russia.
The situation in Georgia
A look at the recent economic data of Georgia seems like a dream for capitalists: The GDP has grown since Covid significantly, and for this year it is expected to be up to 7.5 %. The Ukraine war gave a boost to the economy because high performing and better off IT-staff moved to the country, which led to a boom in housing and investments in infrastructure. Trade roots had to be changed because of the war, so Georgia is today an even more important transit country.
Bourgeois economists are positive on development. The IMF talked of “remarkable resilience amid heightened domestic and geopolitical uncertainty, with strong growth, near target inflation, and moderate debt levels.” This is mainly because since the collapse of the Stalinist regime and economy successive governments have followed the road of neoliberal privatisation, low regulation and open doors for foreign capital. That’s the rosy picture presented.
The other side is, that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economy in the former Georgian Soviet republic (and birthplace of Stalin) broke down, as big parts of the former markets disappeared overnight. A massive de-industrialisation took place which also had effects on the social composition of the population leading to a stronger involvement in agriculture and service from former industrial workers. Tourist tours include trips to abandoned health and industrial infrastructure. Estimations are that it took until recently to only come back to the GDP level at the end of the 1980s – so, over 40 years!
The recent war related growth has not really benefitted ordinary Georgians but led to rising rents, creating new problems. Unemployment is high with officially around 14%, but around one third of young people find no job. The economy is extremely dependent on service and tourism, of the former strong industry hardly anything is left and the agricultural sector is far from modern and based on small, often family run, farms – compare this to the European huge multinational agrarian companies which produce much more and much cheaper. It is completely normal that small groups of cows stand and lie on the streets or even enter the few motorways to find some grass at the central mediation. Beside the booming IT-sector the main products are wine and mineral Water and to a lesser extent fruits and nuts – all together making up more than a third of the country’s exports. Georgia is also top in exporting cars – but not new ones. They import old cars, pimp them up and re-sell them to neighbouring eastern countries. Combined with the many small street traders and private taxis all reminds one of the economy of a poor, post-colonial country.
Country of interest to many
With the size of Bavaria and a population of under four million, Georgia is small. Overall GDP is less than 1% of British GDP. But its geographic position makes it highly interesting for the different imperialist powers. The Port of Poti is key for the Trans-Caucasian Transport Corridor (TRACECA) and especially because the Black Sea ports of Russia and Ukraine have to be taken out of the equation. The OECD comments that “Georgia’s Black Sea ports serve as a gateway for trade between the South Caucasus and Europe, connecting to the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosporus.” This is especially important regarding oil and gas as Georgia hosts the South Caucasus Pipeline, the most important pipeline crossing central Asia without entering Russia or Iran.
Energy is central for the world economy but also for the government in Tbilisi it could become tricky as the deal with Russia that gave Gazprom control over its energy market will end in 2028. And while Georgia is not considered to be one of the main spots for Russian sanctions evasions the EU is critical that exports from EU countries to Georgia have more than doubled from 2021 to 2025.
EU-flags are everywhere and Georgia had started pre-negotiations with the EU about joining the club but this was stopped in reality by both sides in 2024. The EU’s narrative of a lack of democracy takes up a true point as the government of the Georgian Dream is using increasingly authoritarian measures. After the big protests against the “Russian Bill” that targetted NGOs and the civil society, the street in front of the parliament in Tbilisi (around the size of half of a football pitch) is monitored by 46 cameras. Activists are targetted and harassed.
But a lack of democracy was never a real problem to the EU. The real reason for halting the negotiations might be more to avoid further provocation of Russia, at this stage, and the lack of interest to bring a poor country into the EU which would cost more than it would pay in.
The present Georgia government is a more Russia-friendly and EU sceptical one than previous ones. This is one reason why there is opposition, especially among younger and more educated layers in the cities that have hope, or illusions in the EU. Amongst older people and in the countryside there is more scepticism.
This has a material basis as a quick check of the economic connections show: Russia provides around 1.5 million tourists per year to Georgia, the highest numbers going to Georgia, and among the top 10 visiting countries none are in the EU. Top five export partners are Kyrsthan, Kazakhstan, Russia, China and Azerbijan. The main products, wine, mineral water and re-exported cars, have no market in the EU but are sold within the region and traditionally to Russia.
EU membership would not only mean to be stricter regarding the sanctions with Russia but would be a disaster for the rural population. Strengthening ties with China seems more favourable. A trade agreement has already been signed and China is number ten regarding tourists and interest in Georgia’s natural resources that are needed for battery production. None of the involved players – EU, USA, China, or Russia – offer a path of development for Georgia but all have their respective interests and with all of them the future is more that of being looted economically. So the Georgian government, beside its similarities in anti-democratic measures, tries to manoeuvre between those forces to get the maximum from the various countries, which might work for a time but has its limitations and solves none of the main problems.
A dangerous play with nationalist fires
One of the hills in the country’s capital Tbilisi is home to the gigantic monument “Chronic of Georgia”, also known as “Georgian Stonehenge”. It was planned and started during Soviet times and is a combination of homage to Christian history and several historic figures. There is no reference to the working class history, under Stalinism the main content was nationalistic.
And this use of nationalism has since been continued by all political leaders irrespective of whether they were “pro-Russian” or “pro-EU”. This follows the logic: if you don’t have anything really to offer, divert attention with nationalism. The “national question” that includes questions of national independence, and the rights of minorities, has a long and protracted history. Georgia is the home of several minorities including an Armenian and an Azerbijani minority, a growing Russian minority, Kurds, the largely marginalized Bosca (who are most likely related to the Roma people), and a large Muslim minority around Batumi close to Turkey. Abkhazia and South Ossetia were autonomous regions under soviet rule and Adjara even was an autonomous republic. Given all the mistakes and weaknesses especially regarding the national question under the Stalinist Soviet Union the situation became much worse after it collapsed and Georgia became independent. The autonomy of regions was taken away and Christianity was presented as the Georgian religion (10% are Muslim in Georgia and in Adjara 35-50% are Muslim) with the Georgian orthodox church playing an important reactionary and anti-Western role.
The first president after independence, Zviad Gansakhurdia, ruled on the concept of “Georgia for Georgians” (while around 30% of the population did not fit that concept) and also later different political leaders whipped up nationalist chauvinism. This made it easier for Russia to present itself as the supporting big brother of minorities, while trampling itself on minority rights and on the right of self determination in Chechnya and the Ukraine.
Georgia looks back on decades of ethnic clashes and cleansing, such as in 1991, the displacement of 200,000-300,000 people, and the war with Russia over South Ossetia in 2008, leading to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (around 20% of Georgia’s territory) de facto forming independent entities under strong Russian influence.
Neither Brussels nor Moscow, neither Peking nor Washington, will bring a solution
While Georgia is not making headlines, at the moment, this could change quickly. Because of its strategic importance the different imperialist powers need to keep and improve its influence over the country. For the moment being Georgia manoeuvring between the EU, China and Russia might be fine but with the world situation of economic crisis and with imperialist tensions sharpening we will see more nationalism and more sabre-rattling which make armed conflicts possible.
The developments depend highly on the question of whether Georgia’s working class enters the stage. Several uprisings, like the Rose Revolution, in 2003, and the mass protests against the “Russian Law” in 2024 (notwithstanding the involvement of reactionary pro- Western elements) show the preparedness of Georgians to struggle for their rights.
Due to the economic collapse and the changes in the economy, the working class has been weakened in numbers, as many had to find new sources of income in the informal sector, working precariously and becoming “self employed”. But the working class can still be a driving force in society. And while the labour movement is still weak due to the Stalinist legacy and neoliberal policies, there has been a number of important class struggles, like miners’ strikes (2019 and 2023), textile workers’ protests (2020), and industrial disputes in the steel sector.
The EU will bring neither democracy nor economic growth. But the European working class, when moving into action, can be an example. As in many other former Stalinist countries, it took some time for the working class to recover after the collapse of Stalinism and the betrayed hopes in capitalism. But as we saw with the re-awakening of the working class in other Stalinist countries, the development of mass protests, of new trade union structures, of strike movements, of new class consciousness, these are all developments for the future for Georgia, as well.